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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
RANDALL C. LABRUM, 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
vs. 
V. DURRELL CHIVERS, No. 19296 
Defendant/Appellant 
REPLY BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action for specific performance of a contract, 
with appropriate injunctive relief. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The parties are each duly licensed and practicing 
chiropractors in the State of Utah. 
On August 11, 1978, plaintiff and, defendant signed a valid 
ancl binding contract whereby defendant sold his chiropractic 
business, equipment, office and good will to plaintiff. (See 
Appendix 1 ) . In paragraph 4 of Appendix 1, defendant agreed "not 
to open a chiropractic office or to engage in the practice of the 
profession of chiropractic with in Uintah County, State of Utah, 
for a period of ten (10) years." 
On September 16, 1981, plaintiff sold his chiropractic 
business in the Vernal area to one Edwin J. Ruby. The contract 
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specifically stated that the good will of the business was also 
being sold, (See Record, p. 21, Section 2, paragraph 4). Also, 
plaintiff agreed not to compete with Ruby, (See Record, p. 22, 
Section 6). 
In November, 1981, defendant commenced the practice of 
chiropractic medicine in Vernal, Utah, in direct derrogation of 
the contract signed by him on August 11, 1978. 
Plaintiff demanded that defendant cease his practice of 
chiropractic medicine in Vernal, but defendant refused to do so. 
In order to secure his contractual rights, and preserve the gond 
will he had sold to Dr. Ruby, plaintiff filed this action seeking 
an injunction restraining defendant from further practice or 
performance of chiropractic services in Uintah County until 
August 1, 1989, as agreed by the parties in their contract, 
together with damages incurred by plaintiff as a result of 
defendant's breach. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
After a bench trial, District Judge David Sam found that 
defendant had breached a valid and binding agreement and enjoined 
defendant from further chiropractic practice in Uintah County 
until After August 1, 1989, leaving the matter of damages to a 
further hearing, (See Record, p. 35-38). 
Defendant then filed this appeal from the in1unct1on an<l 
ruling that the non-competitive covenanl in the August 11, 1Y7H 
agreement was binding on defendant. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks to have the lower court's ruling affirmed. 
ARGUMENT 
I. RESTRICTIVE COVENANTS ANCILLARY TO A SALE OF BUSINESS 
ARE ENFORCEABLE SO LONG AS THEY ARE REASONABLE 
Restrictive covenants will be upheld where they protect the 
business which they are meant to benefit and are no broader than 
necessary to afford that protection. There is greater reluctance 
to interfere when the covenant is connected to the sale of a 
business. Allen v. Rose Park Pharmacy, 120 Utah 608, 237 P.2d 
823 ( 1951), Gann v. Morris, 122 Ariz. 517, 496 P. 2d 43 ( 1979) 
Threlkeld v. Steward, 24 Okla. 403, 103 P. 630 (1909), Wood v. 
73 Wash. 2d 307, 438 P.2d 587 (1968). Injunctive relief is 
appropriate where an established business is sold with its good 
will and there is a valid covenant not to compete within a 
defined territory. Valley Mortuary Fairbanks, 119 Utah 207, 
225 P.2d 739 (1950). 
"(I)t is well established that covenants not to 
compete are upheld when connected with the sale of a 
business and the result does not hinge upon any trade 
secrets or special business skills which the vendor-
covenantor may be found to possess. when the 
individual responsible for creating the good will and 
the business to which it attached, become separated, it 
is necessary to preserve that good will to the business 
by a covenant on the part of the individual that he 
will not compete in an area where his personal 
reputation will detatch the old customers from the old 
business." Allen Rose Park Pharmacy, 237 P.2d at 
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8 27. 
The reasonableness of a covenant not to compete depends on 
the subject matter of the contract, kind and character of 
business, its location, the purpose to be accomplished by the 
restriction, the intentions of the parties, and the duration of 
and territory covered by the covenant. Gann v. Morris, op cit. 
The medical profession is not exempt from restrictive 
covenants as there is a substantial risk of losing patients to 
their former doctor. Edwards, 83 Nev 189, 426 P.2d 792 
(1967). In fact, businesses whose main commodity is personal 
services would seem to be particularly appropriate for a non-
competitive covenant. 
In this case, the business was a chiropractic practice in 
Vernal. As the business was one involving personal services, it 
was reasonable for plaintiff to believe that the patients would 
follow their chiorpractic doctor if he remained in Uintah County, 
and therefore, it was proper to attempt to preserve the good will 
purchased with a non-competition covenant. 
There is no indication that defendant did not read the 
contract or understand its terms, including the non-competition 
covenant or that there was any inequality in bargaining position. 
Defendant did not allege that he received 
consideration for the sale of his business and its good will or 
that plaintiff failed to perform his obligations under the 
contract. 
What defendant does state is that because the Vernal arPa 
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has experienced considerable growth and plaintiff has since sold 
the chiropractic business and its good will to a third party, he 
(defendant) should be relieved of his obligations under an 
agreement in which he has received everything he bargained for. 
In other words, plaintiff had to give defendant everything 
defendant was to receive, but defendant does not have to so 
perform for plaintiff. 
The good will of a business is anc.illary to that business. 
It is not a personal obligation • .>by defendant to plaintiff 
that disappears as soon as plaintiff no longer. practices 
chiropractic medicine. The good will built up by defendant (and 
subsequently by plaintiff) is a valuable asset of the business 
which was sold to a third party. There is still a substantial 
risk that defendant's old patients would detach themselves from 
the old business if he is allowed to practice in Vernal. The 
rapid growth in Uintah County would have no bearing on this 
concern. Plaintiff contracted for an established chiropractic 
business and in order to ensure, as much as possible, that he 
would not have to find new patients to make his business 
profitable, he bargained for a covenant. In 
order for plaintiff to receive the benefit of that bargain, the 
covenant must be enforced. 
Defendant's argument that plaintiff received the benefit of 
his bargain when he sold the business to Ruby takes a very narrow 
look at the fact situation. Without defendant's covenant to not 
compete, the business would not be as valuable. In order for 
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plaintiff to realize the whole benefit of his barrJain, he had tf, 
sell the good will along with the office furniture and building. 
Once plaintiff ceased to practice chiropractic medicine, all of 
these things would be of little value to him. Therefore, thP 
only logical thing for plaintiff to do would be to sell all of 
them to someone who could make the fullest use of them, i.e., 
another chiropractor. In Allen v. Rose Park Pharmacy, 2 3 7 p. 2d 
at 827, Chief Justice Wolfe quoted Vice Chancellor James and 
stated: 
"On the other hand, (emphasis added) 
requires that when a man has, by skill or by any other 
means, obtained something which he wants to sell. he 
should be at liberty to sell it in the most 
advantageous way in the market." 
When defendant entered into the contract with plaintiff, he 
assumed the risk that because of changes in Uintah County during 
the next ten (10) years, the chiropractic business would become 
more attractive, while plaintiff assumed the risk that it would 
become less attractive. Obviously, the tremendous growth in 
Uintah County was to plaintiff's advantage and defendant's 
disadvantage. But such are the risks undertaken in most 
contracts. Just because things did not turn out quite as 
defendant had anticipated is no reason to allow him to abrogate 
the covenant. 
II. THE LAW OF MONOPOLY HAS NO APPLICATION TO THIS CASE 
Defendant argues that the restrict lV(· cov••nant should tw 
void as against public policy becaus<· plaintiff was not simply 
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"' t•mpt1ng to acquire defendant's business and good will, but was 
attempting to put defendant out of business so that plaintiff 
could have a more complete monoply. 
A monopoly is an exclusive right or power to carry on 
P_i3r!:_icular trade or business, [Dattilo v. Tuscon General 
Hns_E_ital. 23 Ariz. App. 392, 533 P.2d 700 (1975)] control of the 
sale of the whole of a particular commodity, or the power 
to fix·price and exclude actual or potential competitors from any 
part of a trade or business. 
Defendant, in his argument (See Record, p. 33, paragraph 3), 
1n the trial court admits that in 1979, there was at least one 
other practicing chiropractor in Vernal, and that in August 1982, 
that there were four. It would seem obvious that plaintiff did 
not have exclusive power over or control of the whole supply of 
chiropractic medicine in the Vernal area, nor was plaintiff 
excluding competitors. Therefore, the laws applying to 
monopolies are totally .inapplicable in the present case. 
Defendant was hardly precluded from practicing.his skills as 
he was licensed to practice in the entire State of Utah and 
contractually, he was only precluded from practicing in Uintah 
County for ten (10) years. Furthermore, there is no indication 
that Uintah County's chiropractic needs would not be met if 
nr>tendant is precluded from practicing there in accordance with 
t hr, contract which he freely entered into, and for which he 
received good and valuable consideration. 
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CONCLUSION 
By purchase from defendant, plaintiff owned the good will of 
the defendant's chiorpractic business, including that portion 
protected by defendant's non-competitive covenant. Plaintiff 
should be free to sell that which he owns without losing that 
portion protected by the covenant. 
A business providing personal services demands a non-
competitive covenant to protect the good will ancillary to it 
when it is sold. This particular covenant is limited in scope to 
Uintah County and in time to ten (10) years. Neither are 
unreasonable in that they are meant to protect what defendant 
felt was a valuable chiropractic medicine practice located in 
Vernal, when he sold it to plaintiff. 
As defendant received full and adequate consideration in 
exchange for his covenant to not operate a chiropractic practice 
in Uintah County, and there is no indication that he did not 
understand the covenant to not compete, he should not now be 
allowed to abrogate a contract, especially as plaintiff has fully 
performed all his obligations to defendant under that contract. 
Therefore, District Judge Sam's judgment should be upheld by 
this court, and plaintiff should be allowed to proceed to prove 
the damages. 
,, r;-t !, 
DATED day of October, 1983. 
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Roosevelt, Utah 
801-722-2428 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I do hereby certify that on the day of October, 1983, I 
mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing REPLY BRIEF OF 
RESPONDENT, postage prepaid, to Alvin G. Nash, Attorney for 
Defendant/Appellant, P.O. Box 98, Vernal, Utah 84078, by 
depositing the same in the United States Post Office at 
Roosevelt, Utah. 
Secretary 
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This Agreement, made and entered into this ( :./ day of August, 
J978, by and between V. OORRELL CHIVERS of Vernal, Utah, hereinafter known 
as thP Seller, and RANDALL C. LABRUM of Roosevelt, Utah, hereinafter known 
39 the Ruyer, 
Whereas, the Seller is engaged in the practice of Chiropractic 
ln the City of Vernal, Uintah County, State of Utah, and 
Whereas, the Seller has agreed to sell to the Buyer all of his 
right, title and interest in such practice and of the good will therein, 
with such equipment, office furniture and other property as is 
described and set forth in the attached Exhibit "A", and which Exhibit is 
,,de a part of this agreement by reference, 
NOW Il!EREFORE, it is hereby mutually agreed as follows: 
1. That the Seller hereby sells and the purchaser hereby purchases 
the Chiropractic practice of the Seller in Vernal, Utah, together the 
good will thereof, the personal property as set forth in Exhibit "A", 
including all patient records and other property that may be used in 
"'ection with the said practice. 
2. That the Buyer hereby agrees to purchase the said practice and 
personal property herein described and to pay to the Seller therefore 
:he sum of $20,000.00, said payment to be made as follows, to wit: 
I 
I 
\•Heby 
__.....__ 
.-' 
The sum of(!. f;,C(fV , to be paid upon the execution of this 
agreement, the receipt of which is hereby acknowledged by the 
Seller. 
....::> 
The balance of the purchase price, the sum of /::, f7t'O , 
is to be paid by the Buyer assuming and paying the' indebtedness 
of the Seller to the Walker Bank and Trust Company, and which 
indebtedness is for purchase of the following equipment: 
Universal X-Ray Machine 
Zenith Rylo Hydro 
Zenith Rylo Spring 
Lindquist Chronowave, G-5. 
3. That the Seller warrants that the property being conveyed 
is free and clear of all liens aod encumbrances, excepting as to the 
iodebtedne•• set forth lo paragraph 2 hereof. 
4. lbat the Seller hereby agrees not to open a Chiropractic 
Office or to engage in the practice of the profeas[on of Chiropractic 
withln Uintah County, State of Utah, for a period of ten (10) years from 
the date hereof. 
5. lbat the effective date of this agreement .shall be the 
12th day of August, 1978. 
WITNESS, the hands of the parties hereto on this the If r:;. day 
of August, 1978. 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
COUNTY OF \,) I 
) ss. 
) 
On this the \It"' day of August, 1978, personally appeared 
before me V, DURRELL CHIVERS and RANDALL c. LABRUM, signers of the foregoing 
instrument, who being by me first duly sworn, acknowledged to me that they 
executed the same. 
My corrunission expires: 
- 2 -
Notary Public 
Residing at 
